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14.03.2007 REMARKS ON RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA: THE GROWING POLICY CHALLENGES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AT JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
CHAIRMAN ALCEE L. HASTINGS Monday, March
12, 2007
Distinguished Speakers and Guests, Ladies and
Gentlemen,
I would like to thank Freedom House for inviting
me to speak at this important event. Freedom House has well earned
its reputation as one of the foremost democracy-promoting
organizations in the world. Moreover, Nations in Transit – whose
2007 edition this conference is launching – has become an
indispensable source of information, measuring the advance of
democratization around the globe. Thanks also to SAIS for co-hosting
and my congratulations to you on the success of your Russia and
Eurasian Studies Program.
As Paula said, I Chair the Helsinki
Commission, which Congress created in 1976 to monitor and promote
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act in all the participating
States. Moreover, I have recently completed two years as president
of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly – the only American to ever hold
that post. In that capacity, I visited 31 OSCE states, including
Russia and all the Central Asian countries. In my travels and in
Washington, I have met with presidents and foreign ministers, with
parliamentarians, opposition leaders and dissenters, and with
journalists and human rights activists.
In these remarks, I
would like to give you my assessment of where I see democratic
governance and human rights trending in the region, more than 15
years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
But first, I
want to state that we need to take back the moral high-ground that
we once stood on. This starts by holding ourselves accountable when
human rights issues arise here at home. Not that we have anything to
be afraid of. But we must take away the credibility of those who
would accuse us of double standards. As Chairman of the Helsinki
Commission, this will be one of my priorities.
Let me now
talk about Russia. You are all surely familiar with President
Putin’s speech in Munich last month, and how pundits have
characterized U.S.-Russian relations these days. It’s a bad sign
when our Secretary of Defense has to note that “one Cold War was
enough.” Actually, one Cold War was more than enough.
Now, I
understand that Russians remember the 1990s very differently than we
do. Despite what many viewed from abroad as a “springtime” of
freedom for Russia and the territory of the former Soviet Union,
many citizens of Russia remember the nineties as a period of
tremendous economic dislocation, rampant crime, chaos at home, and
humiliation abroad. The relative order and, at least, superficial
international respect that President Vladimir Putin brought to
Russia has been welcomed by a majority of the Russian population and
seems to be strongly supported by the younger generation. From our
point of view, this runs somewhat counter to the assumption that the
post-communist generation would yearn for still greater freedom and
be less pugnacious. It is necessary that we find a way to come to
grips with these divergent views of the recent past as we look to
the future.
So it’s understandable that today, Russians
proudly proclaim that “Russia is back.” This is certainly true, and
in no small measure due to high energy prices. Nor is it surprising
that a great country with vast human and material resources should
rebound from even the disruptions of the last 20 years. What
troubles me and many others is what kind of Russia has returned to a
leading role on the world stage.
Russian officials maintain
that their democracy is developing in its own way and in accordance
with its own traditions. They accuse the United States of
unilateralism in foreign affairs and of seeking to impose the
American form of democratic governance on Russia and the rest of the
world and hypocritically meddling in the affairs of
others.
To be sure, our attempts to spread the undeniable
benefits of the American experience have not always been
distinguished by cultural sensitivity. But I get nervous when I hear
the phrase “according to our own traditions and national mentality.”
No rational person expects Ivan Ivanov to be a carbon copy of John
Johnson. However, there are certain basic shared assumptions about
what democratic governance entails: freedom of religion; freedom of
speech; freedom of assembly; rule of law; a reasonable distribution
of power between the branches of government; an independent
judiciary; etc. I would also note that reference to one’s
“traditions” as a method of denying rights to others is not solely a
Russian phenomenon.
There’s little doubt that under President
Putin – who is undeniably popular – some people have begun to live
better materially. Many Russians are proud of their president, of
his sober, disciplined approach to government and his determination
to restore Russia’s greatness. But in Russia – and Central Asia – we
have witnessed the emergence of super-presidencies, which have
overwhelmed the legislative and the judicial branches.
For
instance, in successfully recentralizing power in the Kremlin,
President Putin has turned the Duma into a virtual rubber stamp.
True, the Duma was quite complicit in this. And I am aware that
American history has also produced “honeymoons” between popular
chief executives and a congressional majority representing the same
political party. We’ve just finished a six year version right here
in Washington. But I hope my colleagues in the Russian Duma would
agree that a vital element of representative government is a
legislature that acts as a check on executive power.
As for
judicial independence – a critical component of checks and balances
– when was the last time a court in Russia ruled contrary to
government wishes in a politically sensitive case in which the
Kremlin or the security forces – some would say they are synonymous
– have an interest?
Especially alarming is the contraction of
freedom of the media. The Kremlin now controls all major TV
stations, which parrot the official perspective. As for newspapers,
though less popular as a source of information, journalism has
become a very dangerous profession. In fact, according to the
International News Safety Institute, Russia is the second most
dangerous country for journalists in the world – the first is Iraq.
Just last week, yet another investigative journalist died under
suspicious circumstances. There is a long list of such crimes, which
have largely gone unsolved. Obviously, the Fourth Estate is being
told to shut its mouth, if it wants to keep its
head.
Furthermore, I am troubled by the government’s attempts
to rein in civil society, at least those elements that the Kremlin
views as threatening. Many of you may have read about the judge who
recently fined members of a local human rights group for meeting in
a school with foreign visitors without notifying the authorities – a
mentality that smacks frighteningly of the Soviet
era.
Russian officials often get irritated when they hear the
terms “managed democracy” or “sham democracy.” But I see in Russia a
system that attempts to carefully control politics, in which the
public has been removed from the political process while the state’s
well-connected individuals have taken charge of the country’s most
profitable giant companies. And it is hard for me to see how or when
this system will open up again.
One way the system could open
up is through legitimate presidential elections in 2008, when
President Putin is expected to retire. But to judge by the current
difficulties reported by “outsiders” testing the waters in Russia,
there is no reason to expect that opposition candidates can count on
an equal playing field.
The rise of “illiberal democracy” at
home is also reflected in Russia’s behavior abroad. For example,
Moscow’s unrelenting pressure on Georgia and Moldova has tarnished
Russia’s reputation as a conscientious upholder of international
law. Especially worrying for Europe are possible interruptions in
oil and gas supplies, as has happened during Russia’s disputes with
its neighbors. Not surprisingly, Washington and other capitals –
even Minsk – are wondering whether Russia can be a reliable supplier
of the energy on which our economies depend.
Of course,
Russia should be able to enjoy the benefits of its energy resources,
which account for fully one-quarter of its GDP. But what will
benefit Russia, as well as transit and consumer countries, would be
more transparency and predictability in energy supply. Think of
Russia moving toward a Canadian or Norwegian model instead of an
OPEC model.
This would entail the promotion of free-market
policies in the energy sector. It would mean the protection of
property rights, which ensure fair competition, backed up by a
commitment to the rule of law that give these rights some meaning.
Such transparency and predictability will help ensure that Russia
can rationally exploit its resources and that consuming countries
can sleep easy – and warm – at night. And Russia’s leaders must
understand that other states have become hypersensitive to the
possibility that the Kremlin will exploit its control of
hydrocarbons for political gain and draw the appropriate
conclusions. Yet I often wonder if they do. Sometimes it seems that
oil has simply gone to people’s heads in Moscow.
As a senior
member of the Intelligence Committee, I am well aware of the gravity
of the terrorist threat facing this country as well as Russia. I
understand the need for us to work together to confront this danger
to the whole world. But the legitimate struggle against terrorism
cannot be an excuse for gross violations of international
humanitarian law and norms – Chechnya comes to mind in this
context.
Before moving on to Central Asia, I would just
emphasize my sincere belief that we best advance our interests with
Russia in an atmosphere of mutual respect and not of mutual
recrimination. Knee-jerk Russia bashing may be emotionally
satisfying for some and may help bolster budgets for others, but it
does little to promote our goals and, in fact, closes many doors for
dialogue and understanding. On the other hand, being best friends
should not be the measure of successful bilateral relations. We need
to focus our efforts more on bolstering Russia’s nascent democratic
institutions rather than on the rapidly changing faces of the
Russian elite.
I would also add that I support granting
Permanent Normal Trade Relations to Russia. Russia has complied with
our law. We spend millions of dollars promoting rule of law abroad,
but we seem unable or too preoccupied to comply with our own
legislation and retire this Cold War relic.
Let me now turn
to Central Asia. Over the last 15 years, we have seen the rise of
the familiar “super-president,” the controlled parliament, the
supine judiciary and the media under pressure, while the families
and cronies of rulers prosper. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, no
political opposition has been permitted. Turkmenistan – which is
still a one-party state today – has been one of the most repressive
countries in the world, virtually a post-Soviet North Korea, with a
similar cult of personality.
In Kazakhstan and Tajikistan,
opposition is tolerated but tightly controlled; there is very little
opposition representation in their parliaments. Only Kyrgyzstan has
bucked the Central Asian trend to some degree. Former President
Akaev did not control the political arena as his counterparts did
and civil society was much stronger than elsewhere in the region. So
it was not surprising that if an opposition-led protest movement in
the region had any chance of toppling a government, it would be in
Kyrgyzstan.
All this was true even before the 2003 Rose
Revolution in Georgia. But that historic event, followed by
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and the March 2005 Tulip Revolution in
Kyrgyzstan, upset the rulers of most former Soviet states. Central
Asian leaders, especially Uzbekistan’s President Karimov, have moved
to preempt similar uprisings in their countries by undercutting
opposition activists, NGOs – including foreign ones, like Freedom
House and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – and human rights
groups.
In this campaign they have received backing from
Moscow, which has warned of sinister U.S. plots of regime change.
Indeed, Moscow unfortunately seems to see democratization as a key
weapon in a zero-sum competition for influence with the United
States. Russia viewed the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and
Kyrgyzstan not only as unwelcome achievements of democracy but as a
new, historic Western “incursion” into its own sphere of influence.
Its apparent strategy is to build alliances with repressive rulers,
while dismissing Western disapproval of their authoritarianism as
geo-politically motivated. In fact, an anti-revolutionary alliance
of states has emerged, embracing most post-Soviet republics and
China as well.
And these efforts have borne fruit – since
Kyrgyzstan, the wave has receded, at least for now.
This
situation puts U.S. policymakers in a tough spot. Even before
September 11, Washington had struggled to find ways to move Central
Asian rulers towards more political openness. But they had already
concluded that even if relations with the Americans were not very
close, the U.S. interest in security, energy and providing a
strategic alternative to Russia meant that Washington might
criticize flawed elections or human rights problems but would not
level serious sanctions or cut off ties.
After September 11,
the countries of Central Asia saw the opportunity for closer
relations with the United States, which was happy to accommodate
them in the name of fighting terrorism. An agreement on strategic
cooperation was struck with Uzbekistan. We opened military bases
there and in Kyrgyzstan. The Tajiks and even Turkmenistan cooperated
in overflights and assistance corridors to
Afghanistan.
Today, economic concerns have come to equal
security priorities: with the price of a barrel of oil down to about
$60 from a high in the mid-70s and Kazakhstan’s oil and
Turkmenistan’s gas beckoning, how do we influence Central Asia’s
leaders to liberalize their political systems? It doesn’t look like
they want to and they seem to think they don’t have to.
There
are no easy answers to this question. Obviously, we cannot compel
them to democratize or observe their human rights commitments. We
have 150,000 troops in Iraq but we can’t ensure basic order, much
less build a democratic state there at this time. Even in the 1990s,
when Russia was much weaker and poorer than it is today, our
leverage was limited. Today, I have the sense that our criticism has
the opposite effect on Russian officials.
The countries of
Central Asia don’t have issues of superpower rivalry with the United
States, and they do want to have good relations with us, which
facilitates dialogue with them about democratization and human
rights. Still, those in power want to remain there – it is their
highest priority and they will resist systemic reforms that could
threaten their position.
You might infer from this overview
that I am a pessimist. Not at all. No black man who grew up during
the halcyon days of the segregated south and became a judge and then
a Congressman while a black woman from the segregated south is
Secretary of State can be a pessimist. But I have become more
realistic and pragmatic. Let me share with you some conclusions I
have drawn.
First, democratic transformations take much
longer than we would like. The experience of the former Soviet Union
proves that the collapse of communism is necessary but not
sufficient. We should understand we are in this for the long
haul.
Second, repressive leaders often maintain that their
people are not ready for democracy. I think, however, that publics
are much more ready than governments. People in Russia and Central
Asia, who have experienced or witnessed enough disruption for
several lifetimes, understandably value stability and
predictability. But that does not mean they do not want the basic
gifts of democracy and human rights. Everyone wants a say in his or
her own government and to be treated with respect. When
circumstances permit, those desires, I believe, will come to the
fore.
Third, we in the West saw the so-called color
revolutions as a glorious exercise in popular sovereignty, as people
peacefully went to the streets to oust corrupt, unresponsive
regimes. But we sometimes forget that revolutions are evidence of
failed politics. They reflect a crisis in the relations between
state and society when people have no satisfactory methods of
influencing policy or seeking redress of grievances, such as
recourse to the courts for the impartial administration of justice.
So while I welcome the Rose, Orange, and Tulip revolutions, I regret
their necessity. Slow, steady progress towards democratic governance
would be better for all concerned. It is this goal we should work
for, through the building of institutions that promote the rule of
law and civil society.
Fourth, in the absence of established
institutions, the ruler’s character remains critical in such highly
personalized political systems. It was clear, for example, that
while President Niyazov lived, there was no chance of reform in
Turkmenistan. The notion may not be popular among some scholars
today, but his long reign clearly demonstrates the power of
individuals to shape history, certainly for ill and I hope, for
good.
Fifth, succession can spark unexpected events and
accelerate or slow down institution-building. I suspect the death of
President Niyazov in December has got the other Central Asian
leaders thinking. They are not young men and they have some serious
inheritance issues to consider. Nowhere has there been established
any tested method for peacefully transferring power at the top. In
Kyrgyzstan, a head of state has been removed, but presidential
succession has come to be associated with street politics as much as
constitutional requirements. In the other countries…well, we will
have to see. But barring dramatic headlines, the first important
such decision will come in Uzbekistan. President Karimov’s term runs
out this year. He will have to decide whether to step down or resort
to some ploy to remain in office. I believe that if he chooses the
latter course, he will damage his reputation still further and make
instability more likely.
Whatever happens, however, I
strongly believe that all of Central Asia will be watching how
President Putin handles his own succession problem. If he steps
down, some may be more inclined to follow his example.
Sixth,
we must not turn our backs on the region and its people. I know
Uzbekistan is a repressive state and I share the widespread
revulsion at the slaughter in Andijon, but does it help us not to be
engaged with President Karimov? Have we gained anything by these
frozen relations – quite apart from the loss of our base at K-2, has
democracy advanced in Uzbekistan while we criticize him from
afar?
At the same time, Tashkent must understand we cannot
turn a blind eye to atrocities. I have supported the European
Union’s serious effort to restore ties with Uzbekistan based on
human rights progress, but I would welcome a good faith gesture from
Tashkent. For example, Umida Niyazova, a human rights activist who
used to work for Freedom House and Human Rights Watch, is in jail. I
call on President Karimov to release her immediately.
As for
Turkmenistan, President Niyazov’s death offers no guarantees of
liberalization. But at least there is reason now to hope for a more
rational leadership that will focus on the public good, not the
president’s ego.
I see mixed messages coming out of Ashgabat.
On the one hand, the new president has pledged to broaden internet
access and has restored the tenth grade and physical education to
the school curriculum. That doesn’t sound like much but when you
start from such a low base, it can seem like a huge improvement. I
expect that gradually, the more bizarre aspects of President
Niyazov’s misrule will disappear. But I hope to see much more – the
release of people jailed on political grounds and the beginnings of
political pluralism. I expect to travel to Ashgabat to discuss with
the new Turkmen leaders the prospects for systemic democratization.
We need to engage with them in a process of consultation and give
and take.
Let me conclude by mentioning a few things we
should not do, starting with not shooting ourselves in the foot. I
have in mind the Voice of America. As many of you probably know, the
American Administration has called for major cuts in VOA
broadcasting, including closing down the Uzbek and Georgian Services
and ending radio programs while retaining television transmission in
Russian and Ukrainian. This, ladies and gentlemen, seems to me to be
the height of folly. As I have argued here, the democratic
transition in the former Soviet Union is far from secure. VOA
broadcasts are one of the most effective, biggest-bang-for-the-buck
tools in our arsenal to propagate democratic ideals.
And in
this connection, I want to associate myself with remarks made on
Thursday by my good friend Tom Lantos, Chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, in a hearing on U.S. assistance. Like him, I
simply cannot comprehend why we should now cut our funding for
democracy promotion – especially to the tune of 40 percent. He
called for more aid to NGOs that try, under ever worsening
conditions, to promote freedom in Russia. I am in full solidarity
with him and together with likeminded Members of Congress, we hope
to roll back the VOA cuts and increase assistance for democracy
promotion.
The same applies to funding for the OSCE, which
the budgeters also want to slash. Please be assured that I will
fight this.
Paula, I’ve gone on for quite some time. I hope I
haven’t overstayed my welcome. Thank you once again for inviting me.
Let me end here and I look forward to hearing from the other
speakers.
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